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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Business method patents have been granted in the United States on a large scale
since 1998. In that year, the State Street decision held that the alleged business method
exception did not exist—and actually never existed.1 According to the State Street
decision, business method patent applications 2 were only rejected because they did not
meet the general statutory requirements (notably novelty, non-obviousness, and a proper
enabling description), or because they were too “abstract” according to well-established
case law. 3
Even though the State Street decision did not purport to change the law, it caused a
strong increase in the number of business method patent applications. 4 The United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) was not properly prepared for this flood, which
led to serious patent quality problems. 5 Some commentators believe that the USPTO has
meanwhile mastered these problems 6 and that the quality of business method patents has
reached at least the same level as the quality of patents in other fields. 7 But this may only
indicate that patent quality in general is a matter of concern. 8
Nonetheless, again and again doubts are raised whether business methods should be
patentable because they are so different from traditional inventions. 9 In order to prevent,
*

Ph.D., Maastricht University; LL.M., (Leiden University); M.Sc., Delft Technical University.
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375–77 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
See also AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
2
E.g., Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908) (a patent for “‘cashregistering and account-checking’ designed to prevent frauds and peculation by waiters and cashiers in
hotels and restaurants”).
3
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853).
4
John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
987, 991 (2003).
5
See, e.g., Robert Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999); Michael J. Meurer,
Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 309 (2002).
6
See, e.g., Allison & Tiller, supra note 4.
7
Starling David Hunter III, Have Business Method Patents Gotten a Bum Rap? Some Empirical
Evidence (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4326-03, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=424081.
8
John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One Technology
at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729 (2006). See generally ADAM B.
JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).
9
See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263 (2000); Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The
Bad Business of Unlimited Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
1
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or at least restrict, business method patenting, some have suggested that only technical
inventions should be patentable. However, courts have consistently rejected such a
requirement with the argument that Congress would have envisaged a broad patent law.
Thus, only a limited number of judicially-created exceptions have been recognized, and
there is no place for additional restrictions (like a technology requirement). Still, even
the Supreme Court is not blind to problems such as “[t]he potential vagueness and
suspect validity of some of these [business method] patents.” 10
Several writers have wondered whether the more restrictive European patent law
could perhaps serve as an example for American patent law. 11 This article focuses on the
question of whether patents in the United States should only be granted for technology,
following the European example. 12
II. SHOULD PATENTS ONLY BE GRANTED FOR TECHNOLOGY?

¶5

¶6

¶7

Even though courts have decided that there is no reason to consider business
method patents different from other patents, these patents have definitely expanded patent
law into a fundamentally different realm. 13 The recent Bilski case shows that these
patents are as controversial as ever. 14 By limiting patentable subject-matter to
technology, business method patents would be eliminated.
We can look to Europe for an example of a patent regime that explicitly requires a
“technical contribution.” Does it lead to a reliable delimitation of patentable subjectmatter, without excluding subject matter for which patent protection is appropriate, in a
way that is sufficiently clear?
Before we answer that question, we will first review the traditional viewpoints on a
technology requirement in American patent law.
A. The American Perception

¶8

A legal argument for the adoption of a technology requirement in American patent
law is based on the constitutional provision: “The Congress shall have Power to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors
the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.” 15 Courts have explained that the expression
“useful arts” in modern language is synonymous with “technological arts.” 16 That does
not mean, however, that patent applications in the United States are rejected due to a lack
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61 (1999).
10
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
11
See, e.g., Laura R. Ford, Alchemy and Patentability: Technology, “Useful Arts,” and the Chimerical
Mind-Machine, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 49 (2005); Robert E. Thomas & Larry A. DiMatteo, Harmonizing the
International Law of Business Method and Software Patents: Following Europe's Lead, 16 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 1 (2007).
12
Cf. David J. Kappos et al., A Technological Contribution Requirement for Patentable Subject Matter:
Supreme Court Precedent and Policy, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 152 (2008),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v6/n2/1/.
13
John R. Thomas, The Patenting of Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (1999).
14
In re Bilski, No. 2007-1130, 2008 WL 4757110 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
15
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16
See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re
Toma, 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611 (C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Musgrave,
431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).

51

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2008

of technical character. American courts have repeatedly indicated that a distinct technical
character test is inappropriate. Inventions have occasionally been identified as in the
"technological" or "useful" arts, but only in answer to mental steps rejections. 17
¶9
For decades, patent applications that would have been rejected in Europe due to a
lack of technical character were rejected in American courts on the basis of a
mathematical algorithm exception, 18 but this exception always had limits, and eventually
it was superseded by a very general “practical utility” requirement late last century. 19
However, this “practical utility” requirement appeared hardly a limitation after State
Street. The result was a flood of business method patents around the last turn of the
century. In reaction, a need was felt again to limit patent law to technology. In 2001, this
technology requirement was recognized in an “unpublished” 20 Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences (BPAI) decision. 21 A few years later, however, the same BPAI panel
decided in Lundgren that a patent application for a management method—a business
method devoid of any technical character, requiring no computer—is patentable because
it has “practical utility.” Dissenting judges made extensive investigations, in vain, to
argue that this unusual patent application should have been rejected because there was no
technical content. 22
¶10
Recent cases show that judges are questioning whether “practical utility” is the
proper test for patentable subject-matter. 23 Last year, in the Comiskey decision, a
“method and system for mandatory arbitration involving legal documents” was classified
as an unpatentable “mental process.” 24 The same day, in the Nuijten decision, a patent
for a technical invention was rejected because a “signal” would not fit any of the four §
101 categories. 25 These cases are particularly remarkable because the “mental steps
exception” as an independent criterion was rejected a long time ago, 26 and because the §
101 categories 27 were always said to require the broadest possible interpretation. 28

17

See, e.g., Toma, 575 F.2d 872.
See, e.g., Stephen A. Becker, Drafting Patent Applications on Computer-Implemented Inventions, 4
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237 (1991).
19
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
20
While the decision actually has been published, it is still marked as “unpublished”; because this is a
term with a specific meaning in American law. See generally Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Votes to Allow
Citation to Unpublished Opinions in Federal Courts, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005548639.
21
Ex parte Clement W. Bowman, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1669 (2001) (appeal number 1999-0583 in front of the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences for patent application 08/418,152).
22
Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 2005 Pat. App. LEXIS 34, at *12 (2005) (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (appeal number 2003-2088 in front of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences for patent
application 08/093,516).
23
Scott D. Locke & William D. Schmidt, Business Method Patents: The Challenge of Coping with an
Ever Changing Standard of Patentability, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1079 (2008).
24
In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
25
In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
26
In re Prater & Wei, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
27
The four categories listed in 35 U.S.C. § 101 are: process, machine, manufacture, and composition of
matter.
28
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (noting that Congress “plainly contemplated that
the patent laws would be given wide scope”).
18

52

Vol. 7:1]

Reinier B. Bakels

B. European Patent Law
¶11

The European Patent Office (EPO) only grants patents for inventions that make a
technical contribution. 29 In order to evaluate this rule, three questions must be answered:
does the rule have a proper statutory basis, does the rule lead to an unambiguous result,
and are the limits set by the rule really meaningful?
¶12
Until recently, the European Patent Convention (EPC) did not contain an explicit
technology requirement, but only an enumeration of subject matter that is not patenteligible as such, 30 including scientific theories, business methods and software. 31 The
EPO observed that all listed subject matter is abstract and/or lacks a technical character,
and it draws the questionable conclusion that this subject matter still can be patented as
long as it is technical. 32 In sum, the EPO concludes that “as such” is the opposite of
“technical.” In support of this vision, reference is made to a “self-evident” tradition, by
default of an explicit statutory rule requiring a technical character. And it is sometimes
argued that the frequent use of the word “technical” in patent legislation is an indication
that framers of the EPC intended only technology to be patented. In particular, the
requirement of the Implementing Regulations to the EPC 33 to “define the matter for
which protection is sought in terms of the technical features of the invention” 34 and to
“disclose the invention . . . in such terms that the technical problem . . . can be
understood” 35 in a patent application is seen as an argument for a technology
requirement. Needless to say, this is a questionable argument, as a British court noted
aptly when it qualified this argument as “a counsel of desperation to use what is little
more than a procedural rule in place of major substantive provisions of the
Convention.” 36
¶13
In December 2007, a clause was added to the EPC stating that patents are granted
“in all fields of technology.” 37 According to the explanatory document for this treaty
29

LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR THE BOARDS OF APPEAL, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, CASE LAW OF
THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE 1–19 (Albert Ballester Rodès et al. eds., 2006),
available at http://www.epo.org/patents/appeals/case-law.html.
30
Article 52(3) of the EPC explicitly says that the exclusions listed in Article 52(2) EPC only apply to
the listed subject-matter “as such.” European Patent Convention art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199
(as amended Nov. 29 2001), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/epc.html [hereinafter
EPC], (“Paragraph 2 shall exclude the patentability of the subject-matter or activities referred to therein
only to the extent to which a European patent application or European patent relates to such subject-matter
or activities as such.”).
31
Id. (Article 52(2) is the counterpart to 35 U.S.C. § 101).
32
Case T-0953/94, Georges v. Pettit (Technical Board of Appeal of the EPO 1996), available at
http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t940953eu1.pdf (admitting that this observation should be
taken “cum grano salis”).
33
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European
Patents, in EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION 209–429 (2006), available at
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/epc.html (the provisions in these Regulations are designated as
“rules”—these rules are usually referenced in EPO case law as “Rule nnn EPC,” where nnn is the number).
34
Rule 43 EPC, supra note 33 (Rule 29 under EPC 1973).
35
Rule 42 EPC, supra note 33 (Rule 27 under EPC 1973).
36
In re Patent Applications GB 0226884.3 and 0419317.3 by CFPH L.L.C., 2005 EWHC 1589 Pat, ¶ 78
n.28 (2005), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2005/1589.html.
37
EPC, supra note 30, art. 52(1). This change is one of the many changes that were agreed at a
Diplomatic Conference in 2000. These changes only went in force late 2007, as the EPC is not an EU
regulation, but a separate international treaty that must be ratified by a sufficient number of member states
before entering into force.
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change, this clause would codify the technology requirement. 38 The wording is identical
to a clause in a provision of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS” Agreement). 39 The TRIPS provision, however, disallows
exclusion or discrimination of any field of technology. 40 By copying this clause literally
into the EPC, the TRIPS requirements seem to be met, but the EPC intent is quite the
opposite: to discriminate against inventions outside the domain of technology, such as
business methods. 41
¶14
If indeed patents should only be granted for “technology,” a precise legal definition
of this concept is apparently indispensable. Still, it is often said that such a definition is
redundant because everybody would in practice be able to recognize “technology”
intuitively, even though it may be difficult to define the concept in words. And it is often
argued that the technology concept in European patent law is another concept subject to
the adage: “I know it when I see it.” 42 On closer review, however, intuition fails to
delimit technology.
For instance, software is usually considered undoubtedly
“technical,” but in patent law a complicated, and not always convincing, distinction is
made between technical and non-technical software. 43
¶15
The EPC’s exclusion of business methods only to the extent to which the patent or
patent application relates to a business method “as such,” arguably allows business
methods not “as such” to be patented. In the EPO conception that “as such” is the
opposite of “technical” (as explained above), this provision implies that the EPC does not
prohibit technical business methods to be patented. 44 Apparently a restriction to
technology does not achieve a categorical exclusion of business methods. Are patents for
technical business methods acceptable because they relate to technology, or are they just
as undesirable as any other business method patents? Here, we face the problem of the
vagueness of the “business method patent” concept. 45

38
Basic Proposal for the Revision of the European Patent Convention 43, Munich, Oct. 13, 2000,
available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/epc2000/diplomatic-conference-nov2000.html
(follow the “MR/2/00” link next to the “Basic proposal for the revision of the EPC” text).
39
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, art. 27(1), Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, available at http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.
40
Joseph Straus, Implications of the TRIPs Agreement in the Field of Patent Law, in FROM GATT TO
TRIPS: THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 160
(Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996).
41
During the negotiations for a future Substantive Patent Law Treaty under the auspices of WIPO, this
difference in interpretation appeared a major road-block for world-wide patent law harmonisation. World
Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents: Seventh Session, Report, ¶¶
160, 171, SCP/7/8 (Nov. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_7/scp_7_8.pdf (“The [U.S.] Delegation was of the view that,
if the SCP could not agree on the goal of harmonization and best practices, then the entire purpose of the
discussions may be called into question.” The U.S. delegation even threatened to leave the conference if
this issue was not resolved in a satisfactory manner.).
42
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (referring to the “obscenity”
concept and the Court’s attempt to “define what may be indefinable”).
43
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 29, at 1–14.
44
Id. at 15–18.
45
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“Office personnel have had difficulty in properly treating claims directed to methods of doing business.
Claims should not be categorized as methods of doing business. Instead such claims should be treated like
any other process claims.”).
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¶16

The framers of the original EPC deliberately refrained from giving a legal
definition of “technology” because technology is constantly evolving, and because the
very purpose of patent law is to protect novel technology. A fixed definition would
therefore impair the flexibility in respect to future developments. 46 But a variable
“technology” concept is also inherently unfit for use in a legal criterion. Since it is
obviously not the intent of patent law that the patent office honors all “market demand”
of applicants, a more restrictive “meta-rule” would be needed to determine the contents
of the legal technology concept at a given point in time. However, there is no such rule.
¶17
Finally, the application of the technology concept requires an answer to the
question of whether the invention as a whole must be technical or whether specifically
the novel aspects of the invention must be technical. It is a principal rule of patent law
that inventions should always be assessed as a whole. On the other hand, it seems
unacceptable that an invention having only non-technical novel aspects can be “made”
technical by adding a technical component that by itself is not novel. Under the latter
rule, a business method would be technical even if it is only implemented on a
conventional computer in a straightforward manner. The EPO apparently solves this
dilemma by paying lip service a whole-contents approach, but also requiring the
invention to distinguish itself sufficiently from the state of the art 47 in a technical sense. 48
At first blush, this approach is perhaps more appealing, but in actuality, the difference is
only cosmetic 49 because this rule still requires the technical aspect of the invention to be
novel. The rejected proposal for a European Directive for “computer-implemented
inventions” also followed this confusing approach. 50
¶18
European jurisprudence still has been unable to make a choice between these two
approaches that fundamentally can not coexist. Both approaches are equally persuasive if
the words are carefully chosen, so apparently courts are free to choose whatever approach
best advances the desired policy effect. A dissection works out restrictively, while a
whole-contents approach has an expansive effect. 51
46

Gert Kolle, The Patentable Invention in the European Patent Convention, 5 INT’L REV. OF INTELL.
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 140, 145 (1974). See also Justine Pila, Article 52(2) of the Convention on the
Grant of European Patents: What Did the Framers Intend? A Study of the Travaux Préparatoires, 36 INT’L
REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 755 (2005).
47
This interpretation may be based on the fact that the (equally authentic) French and German text of the
non-obviousness provision in the EPC (Art. 54) refer to the “état de la technique” and the “Stand der
Technik” respectively.
48
Case T-1173/97, IBM Computer Program Product I, 22 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EPO 609 (1999)
(Boards of Appeal of the EPO 1998); Case T-931/95, Pension Benefit Systems, 24 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF
THE EPO 441 (2001) (Boards of Appeal of the EPO 2000).
49
Wilfried Anders, The Patentability of Computer Programs and Business Methods: Recent Decisions
of the Federal Court of Justice and the Federal Patent Court, 24 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EPO 130, 140
(2nd special ed. 2001), available at http://www.european-patentoffice.org/epo/pubs/oj001/06_01/06_spe1.pdf (“Sceptics argue that this has no bearing on the patentability
of computer programs. . . . Even if this is true, shifting the focus of the problem is a big step forward,
bringing clarity and credibility.”).
50
Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions (Feb. 20, 2002), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2002/com2002_0092en01.pdf.
51
RALPH NACK, DIE PATENTIERBARE ERFINDUNG UNTER DEN SICH WANDELNDEN BEDINGUNGEN VON
WISSENSCHAFT UND TECHNOLOGIE [THE PATENTABLE INVENTION UNDER THE CHANGING CONDITIONS OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY] 118–189 (2002) (F.R.G.) (arguing that the courts could not apply a wholecontents approach if and when they did not want to uphold a certain software patents, for whatever reason).
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¶19

Both because of the vagueness of the legal technology concept and the whole-orpart dilemma, European law about the assessment of the technical content of inventions is
extremely complex. It is therefore often hard to predict whether a particular patent
application will be honored. 52 This legal certainty problem should be given proper
attention, distinct from the policy question of whether patents should be allowed outside
the technology domain.
¶20
Most important is, of course, the question of whether a technology requirement is
meaningful at all. Are technology patents desirable and non-technical patents
undesirable, generally speaking? It seems virtually impossible to answer that question,
not just because of the above definition problems, but above all, because it presupposes
the feasibility of an a priori distinction of “desirable” and “undesirable” patents.
¶21
In sum, we must conclude that the statutory basis to limit patent law to technology
is questionable, the rules confusing, and the effectiveness unclear—because there is no
clear purpose. Exclusion of non-technical inventions is an indirect method to achieve a
purpose. But, what actually is that purpose?
III. A NEW VISION ON THE DELIMITATION OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
¶22

If “technology” is not a good criterion to distinguish patentable subject matter from
non-patentable subject matter, what criterion should we use? There are at least two
starting points to answer this question: the structure of patent law and the objectives of
patent law.
A. Reasoning from the Structure of Patent Law

¶23

The contents of patent rights are logically connected with the possible objects of
patent rights. A patent right is in essence a right for the application (the object) of certain
knowledge (the content). 53 So, patents are about knowledge fit for application. And, the
applications should be known, named, and elaborated, because the law should not allow
patents to cover more than has actually been invented. 54 In other words, a patent is not a
“hunting license.” 55 There is a statutory obligation to describe an invention in a patent
application such that it enables any relevant person skilled in the art to apply the
invention, 56 and it should not require “undue experimentation.” 57

See also KNUT BLIND ET AL., SOFTWARE-PATENTE. EINE EMPIRISCHE ANALYSE AUS ÖKONOMISCHER UND
JURISTISCHER PERSPEKTIVE [SOFTWARE PATENTS. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FROM AN ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE], para. 57 (2003) (F.R.G) (including a graph showing a strong periodical variation in
the application of the whole-contents approach by German courts from 1975–2001).
52
Felix Rummler, Computer Program Inventions Before the German Courts—A Review, 36 INT’L REV.
OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 225, 234 (2005) (complaining that EPO practice is “imperfect and
often unpredictable”).
53
For the purpose of this argument, it is irrelevant that the statute uses the word “invention” as well for
the product resulting from the applications of the inventive concept, and that the patent owner usually only
obtains the right to prohibit others from using his invention. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 28, supra note 39; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
54
See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854).
55
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966).
56
35 U.S.C. § 112.
57
USPTO MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 2164.01(a) (8th ed., rev. 7 2008).
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¶24

Consequently, some knowledge, however useful, can not be patented, and this
shows that the content of a parent right limits the object of patent law. But that should
not come as a surprise. Researchers involved in fundamental science get a monthly
salary, rather than a share in the eventual revenue generated from their contributions. 58
And, the position of attorneys is similar in that they are paid only once—their fee may
depend on the outcome of a case, but they usually do not claim a share of the benefit their
clients eventually enjoy from the knowledge they provide. These examples illustrate that
if someone produces knowledge, the general rule is that there is direct compensation for
the effort. The exception—effectively proving the rule—is the kind of ownership of
knowledge provided by patent law, lasting potentially for twenty years.
¶25
Since the content of a patent right thus limits the object of patent law, the question
remains whether a choice of different contents may allow different objects. The
characteristic of a patent is that the owner is granted nearly absolute control on the
application of his or her invention (during the patent term). Thus “intellectual property”
is virtually equated to real property, in that sense. But, is there really a need to allow the
patent holder to deny others the use of an invention? Knowledge is after all a “nonrivalrous good.” 59 Would it not be sufficient to allow the patent owner to ask for
reasonable compensation? The Supreme Court recently decided that an injunction should
not automatically be issued based on a finding of patent infringement. 60 Suggestions
have also been made for a modified patent law that does not allow patent holders to block
the use of their inventions, while still guaranteeing an appropriate remuneration. 61 For
the time being, such proposals have mostly academic value. Mainstream thinking
considers patents a kind of “property” that is just as inviolable as real property, so that the
patent owner indeed deserves full control.62
B. Reasoning from the Objectives of Patent Law
¶26

The objectives of patent law provide another starting point. It is important to note
at the outset that economists and lawyers each have their own view on the purposes of
patent law. Economists invariably assume that patents serve to allow their owners to
recoup the research and development cost of inventions by internalizing the
externalities 63 of those inventions, i.e., by allowing such measures that the profits of
58
FRIEDRICH-KARL BEIER & JOSEPH STRAUS, DER SCHUTZ WISSENSCHAFTLICHER
FORSCHUNGSERGEBNISSE: WUGLEICH EINE WÜRDIGUNG DES GENFER VERTRAGES ÜBER DIE
INTERNATIONALE EINTRAGUNG WISSENSCHAFTLICHER ENTDECKUNGEN [THE PROTECTION OF THE RESULTS
OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: WITH AN OPINION ABOUT THE GENEVA TREATY ON THE INTERNATIONAL
RECORDING OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES] (1982) (F.R.G).
59
PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 37 (18th ed. 2005).
60
eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
61
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 95 (2007), available at
http://www.epo.org/topics/patent-system/scenarios-for-the-future.html.
62
ILKKA RAHNASTO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, EXTERNAL EFFECTS AND ANTI-TRUST LAW 49–
59 (2003) (explaining that intellectual property rights are increasingly considered as genuine property
rather than artificial rights created for economic reasons only); Robert P. Merges, The Economic Impact of
Intellectual Property Rights: An Overview and Guide, 19 J. CULT. ECON. 103, 110 (1995) (“The
presumption now is that anything nominally creative should receive legal protection. . . . [T]hese rights are
extended on the basis of an incomplete theory, often a rhetorically charged version of a primitive labor
theory.”).
63
SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 59, at 36 (“Externalities occur when firms or people impose
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inventions accrue to the inventor. Numerous economic publications investigate the
optimum “height,” “breadth,” and “length” 64 of patents, so that costs are recovered, but
not much more, as that would not be socially efficient. 65
Nonetheless, these assumptions cannot be generally true. The results of
fundamental research, however costly, cannot be patented; this is true in the American
patent regime 66 as well as the European regime. 67 In contrast, there are no objections
against patenting coincidental or “flash of genius” inventions. 68 This is actually codified
in an American statute: “[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the
invention was made.” 69 The justification of patents as a reward has been rejected by
American courts as well as legal academics. 70 In fact, all traditional patent justification
theories are debatable. 71
In conclusion, the existence of costs is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
to grant patents. I am aware that this observation is a radical departure from conventional
wisdom among economists. However, a different perception would inevitably lead to the
conclusion that all business methods should be patentable.
If patents do not serve a cost-recovery purpose, what is their purpose? Often
patents are said to create a “monopoly.” While, strictly speaking, this is incorrect
because there are often “substitutes,” 72 the purpose of patents is still to attain a certain
exclusivity—a limitation of free competition. Thus, patent law is directly opposed to the
common perception that restrictions for a free market should be avoided in order to
provide incentives for suppliers to deliver the best quality for the lowest price.
However, virtual “perfect competition” eventually reduces profits to zero.73
Therefore, firms will try to differentiate themselves on the market. That leads to
“monopolistic competition,” 74 a form of competition that provides a better balance
between the interests of suppliers and consumers. Differentiation can be achieved in

costs or benefits on others outside the marketplace.”).
64
In this conception the “height” is the inventive step, the “breadth” is the extent of protection, and the
“length” is the patent term. From a legal perspective, not all of these “parameters” are available for (this)
optimization though.
65
See, e.g., Patrick F. E. Beschorner, Optimal Patent Length and Height, 35 EMPIRICA 233 (2008);
Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. OF ECON. 112 (1990).
66
Excluded are “laws of nature,” “physical phenomena” and “abstract ideas.” See Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (with references to older case law).
67
EPC, supra note 30, art. 52(2a). Often quoted examples include the fact that Einstein could not have
patented the formula E = mc², and that Newton could not have patented the law of gravity, as was also
noted by a British court: Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., 2006 EWCA Civ 1371, 2006 WL 3102401,
¶¶ 9, 14 (2006).
68
Cal. Research Corp. v. Ladd, 356 F.2d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
69
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
70
NUÑO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS: WITH AN INTRODUCTION ON THE
HISTORY AND THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF PATENTS 2 (2nd ed. rev. 2005) (citing the following cases:
Sinclair & Carroll v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327 (1945); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S.
265 (1942); Morton Salt v. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Motion Picture Patents v. Universal Film Mfg.,
243 U.S. 502 (1917)).
71
Fritz Machlup & Edith E.T. Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON.
HIST. 1, 10–28 (1950).
72
SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 59, at 92.
73
Id. at 150.
74
Id. at 168.
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many ways. 75 For instance, building a strong brand image is a tried-and-true method of
differentiation.
Usually, differentiation is possible without regulatory intervention. Only in
exceptional cases is there no natural way to differentiate. In such cases, legal means—
notably patents 76 —may help to turn knowledge that lacks natural exclusivity into an
exclusive resource, thus allowing that knowledge to contribute to differentiation. 77
These types of interventions are exceptions to the rule of free competition, so
knowledge should only be made exclusive if it lacks natural exclusivity. Knowledge has
natural exclusivity if it cannot be applied by ordinary craftsmen, but only by scarce
experts with special skills.
Therefore, it is essential to distinguish knowledge requiring special skills, and
knowledge fit for application by any person skilled in the art. Both forms of knowledge
are fit for application, having some form of “practical utility.” 78 Under the current patent
law, both types of knowledge are statutory subject matter. “Upstream” knowledge, such
as purely scientific knowledge, has no use without the intervention of someone with
special skills: an inventor. Such knowledge therefore has a natural exclusivity, obviating
the need for the artificial exclusivity of patents.
Similarly, the application of business methods also requires special skills. A
businessman is a kind of inventor, in the sense that mere craftsmanship does not suffice
for business success. That is, business is not routine, and businessmen encounter external
factors beyond their control—just as inventors do. This means that the knowledge of a
business method has a natural exclusivity as well, and therefore does not need the
artificial exclusivity of a patent. Arguably, the application of some business methods,
e.g. bookkeeping methods, do not require rare talents. Here we again face the vagueness
of the “business method” concept. All confusion can be avoided by asking only whether
the application of certain knowledge requires either inventor-like talents, or just mere
craftsmanship.
Artists incidentally also resemble inventors in this sense, because their creative
work is not just a matter of craftsmanship. The need for storyline patent protection,
therefore, should be seriously questioned . 79 The author elaborating a storyline has ample

75
F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 571
(3rd ed. 1990).
76
Secrecy is an alternative: easy, but limited. Breaking a secret may be a crime or a tort, but a secret
itself usually is not protected as “intellectual property.” Also, unlike patented inventions, secrets can not be
published while reserving the right to apply them.
77
Occasionally firms benefit from disposing exclusively of certain production means. Incidentally, that
does not only apply to knowledge.
78
Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 857 (1980) (“‘Practical utility’ is a shorthand way of attributing
‘real-world’ value to claimed subject matter.”).
79
Andrew F. Knight, A Potentially New IP: Storyline Patents, 86 J.PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 859
(2004). This writer offers his services to obtain such patents on http://www.plotpatents.com. Other writers
are more critical: Ben Manevitz, What's the Story with Storyline Patents—An Argument Against the
Allowance of Proposed Storyline Patents and for the Rejection of Currently Pending Storyline Patent
Applications, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 717 (2006); Anu R. Sawkar, Are Storylines Patentable?
Testing the Boundaries of Patentable Subject Matter, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 3001 (2008).
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opportunities to distinguish himself. This applies to any “skills-based profession.” 80
Sports are yet another example. 81
¶36
Patents are often associated with “protection.” This word is misleading, though.
As noted, patents only serve to protect against excessive competition. A general
competition protection would violate the principle of the free market, which is the basis
of the western economy. Eventually, “creative destruction” is inevitable in an innovating
economy. 82 Undue “protection” hampers innovation.
C. Synthesis of Findings
¶37

The analysis of both the structure of patent law and its objectives leads to the same
conclusion: patents are only justified and necessary in cases of precisely-delimited
knowledge that is described in a way fit for routine application by an average craftsman,
not requiring the special skills of an inventor, businessman, artist, or sportsman.
D. Incorporation into Current Patent Law

¶38

Current patent law requires a proper “enabling description” of the invention in
patent applications. 83 While at first sight the related provision § 112 is merely a rule for
the form of patent applications, there has been an understanding for some time now that
this provision also entails a substantive meaning. 84 Lack of a proper description may
indicate that such a description is impossible because the application has not been
sufficiently elaborated. Therefore, such “abstract ideas” do not qualify for a patent.
¶39
Remarkably, § 112 draws the same limits as we just found from our analysis of the
system and the objectives of patent law. A proper application of the present statute may,
therefore, already entail a significant limitation of business method patentability. Section
112 is not just a procedural rule, but also implies a substantive limitation.
¶40
An objection to this line of reasoning might be that the patent law system would not
allow the enablement test in § 112 to be mixed with the subject-matter test in § 101. But,
that does not actually happen. Section 112 only logically reflects on § 101. Subject
matter that cannot comply with § 112 cannot be statutory subject matter. Section 112
does not become redundant however, because not all applications that can comply with
this statutory requirement will actually do so.
¶41
So we must conclude that “abstract ideas” that do not qualify for patents according
to age-old case law 85 are characterized by the lack of an enabling description in the sense
of § 112, that is sufficient for a “person having ordinary skill in the art,” because that
implies that the invention has been elaborated insufficiently, and will have an overly wide
scope.
80

Neeraj Arora, Disabling Patentability for Skill-Based Inventions: Aligning Patent Law with
Competition Policy, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2005).
81
See, e.g., Derek Bambauer, Legal Responses to the Challenges of Sports Patents, 18 HARV. J. LAW &
TECH. 401 (2005), available at http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v18/18HarvJLTech401.pdf.
82
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
83
35 U.S.C. § 112. The comparable provision in European patent law is Art. 83 EPC.
84
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Whether
the patent's claims are too broad to be patentable is not to be judged under Section 101, but rather under
Sections 102, 103 and 112.”).
85
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853).
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In its recent decision, In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit again rejects a technology
test, but it adopts a “machine-or-transformation” test. 87 While a comprehensive review
of this complicated case is beyond the scope of this Article, it can be noted that this test
also strives to prevent abstract ideas from being patented, but basically on different
grounds: the purpose of this test is to prevent fundamental principles from being preempted, in line with the Supreme Court precedent. 88 Still, it is an accepted consequence
of patent law that a patent may cover “fundamental” knowledge to the extent that it
creates a true monopoly—as long as the invention is properly disclosed. If the patent law
system and objectives are not properly understood, a “machine-or-transformation” test
may lead to interpretation problems similar to the problems that occurred in the decades
preceding the State Street Bank decision.
86

IV. FINAL THOUGHTS
¶43

It is tempting to consider a European-style technology requirement to prevent
patent law from exceeding its “traditional” boundaries, whatever they are. The European
experience, however, is not promising: the technology requirement has led to
complicated rules and legal uncertainty, while there is no logical relationship with the
objectives of patent law. A rule that is ultimately based on tradition, with nothing more,
offers little help for interpretations that reflect the purpose of patent law and do not only
rely on the word-play so commonly found in patent law. Some argue that patent law
should move with the times, while others argue that it should adhere to its age-old
principles. Both arguments appear equally strong. And, as a British court noted, “the
word ‘technical’ is not a solution. It is merely a restatement of the problem in different
and more imprecise language.” 89
¶44
As we have seen, the actual solution is found by an unorthodox analysis of the
structure and objectives of patent law. Patent statutes 90 contain all of the necessary
conditions for a proper delimitation of patentable “subject matter.” If the statutory text is
followed closely and consistently, mindful of the above arguments, a meaningful
distinction is made between patentable and unpatentable business methods and other
subject-matter.
¶45
The adage that “anything under the sun made by man” should be patent-eligible has
created the misconception that patent law is a general instrument for knowledge
protection. The free trade principle, which is embraced in most parts of the world,
requires a basic freedom of ideas, except in cases where a restriction of this freedom is
necessary. As we have seen, that is rarely the case. Furthermore, patent law as a
“property rights” system is unfit for many forms of knowledge. Patent protection should
be considered an exception—an intervention in the free market that is necessary only in

86

In re Bilski, No. 2007-1130, 2008 WL 4757110 at *10 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at *15.
88
E.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972).
89
In re Patent Applications GB 0226884.3 and 0419317.3 by CFPH L.L.C., 2005 EWHC 1589, 2005
WL 1801209, ¶ 14 (2005), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2005/1589.html.
90
Art. 83 EPC is similar to 35 U.S.C. § 112.
87
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exceptional circumstances. The idea of “compensation” can not be the guiding principle.
Descartes never said “cogito ergo patent”—I think, therefore I deserve a patent.91

91

Sven J.R. Bostyn, Ik denk, dus ik krijg een patent. Patenteerbaarheid van bedrijfsvoeringsmethodes
en ideeën in Europa en de VS [I Think, Therefore I Get a Patent. Patentability of Business Methods and
Ideas in Europe and the U.S.], 69 BIJBLAD BIJ DE INDUSTRIËLE EIGENDOM 77, 88 (2001) (Neth.) (the title
of this article is a variation on the famous statement made by the renowned French philosopher René
Descartes (1596–1650): “Cogito ergo sum”—“I think, therefore I am”).
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